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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Section 78-2-
2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
In a municipality operating under a council-mayor form of government, must a 
resolution calling a special election to propose adopting a different form of government 
for the municipality be passed by both the city council and the mayor? 
The standard of review for this question of statutory interpretation is one of 
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court. Toone v. Weber County, 57 P.3d 
1079, 1081 (Utah 2002). 
The issue was preserved by the instant appellant by way of a Motion to Dismiss 
or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment filed in the trial court, a copy of which is 
contained in the Addendum to this Brief. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
3) "Governing body" means collectively the legislative body and the executive of any 
municipality. Unless otherwise provided: 
(a) in a city of the first or second class, the governing body is the city commission; 
(b) in a city of the third, fourth, or fifth class, the governing body is the city council; 
and 
(c) in a town, the governing body is the town council. U.C.A. 10-1-104(3). 
1) A municipality may reorganize under any form of municipal government 
provided for in this part or under Section 10-3-103, 10-3-104, 10-3-105, or 10- 3-
106, regardless of the city's class under Section 10-2-301. 
2) Reorganization under Subsection (1) shall be by approval of a majority of 
registered voters of the municipality voting in a special election held for that 
purpose. 
3) (a) The proposal may be entered on the ballot by resolution passed by the 
governing body of the municipality or by initiative as provided for in Title 20A, 
Chapter 7, Part 5, Local Initiatives -Procedures. U.C.A. 10-3-1203 
(l)(a) The optional form of government known as the council-mayor form vests the 
government of a municipality that adopts this form in two separate, independent, and 
equal branches of municipal government: the executive branch, consisting of a mayor 
and the administrative departments and officers; and the legislative branch, consisting 
of a municipal council. 
(b) The optional form known as the council-manager form vests the government of 
the municipality in a municipal council, which is considered to be the governing body 
of the municipality, and a manager appointed by the council. U.C.A. 10-3-1209 
(1) "Municipality" means any city of any class or town in the state of Utah. 
(2) "Governing body" means the legislative body of any city or town organized 
under this Act. U.C.A. 10-6-104 (1975) (repealed) 
-The municipal council of a municipality adopting an optional form of 
government provided for in this act shall be the governing body of that 
municipality and shall pass ordinances, appropriate funds, review municipal 
administration, and perform all duties that may be required of them by law. 
U.C.A. 10-6-113 (1975) (repealed) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of a final judgment entered on July 18, 2003 by Judge L.A. 
Dever, Third District Court. The case arose out of a Petition for Declaratory Judgment 
filed on July 3, 2003 by H. Craig Hall, City Attorney of Holladay City, Utah. The 
Petition sought a declaration as to whether the Mayor of Holladay City has the right to 
participate in approving and/or vetoing a resolution which was passed by the Holladay 
City Council on June 19, 2003 setting a special election to propose a change in the form 
of government for the City of Holladay. Oral arguments were held before the District 
court on July 15, 2003. The District Court's July 18, 2003 Order rendered judgment in 
favor of the Holladay City Council and against the Mayor. The District Court restyled 
the action as Council of Holladay City v. Mayor Dennis Larkin. Two citizens groups 
moved for, and were granted leave to, intervene in the District Court: Holladay Citizens 
for Progress, in support of the City Council's position; and the Holladay Preservation 
League, in support of the Mayor's position. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The City of Holladay currently operates under a council-mayor form of 
government, which it has utilized since the incorporation of the City in 
1999. Transcript of July 15, 2003 Hearing, p. 14.1 
2. The current Mayor and City Council of Holladay City have had many 
well-publicized disagreements over policies and practices. Transcript of 
June 19, 2003 City Council Meeting (attached to City Council's Petition 
for Declaratory Judgment), pp. 1-18. 
3. At a work meeting of the Holladay City Council held on May 29, 2003, 
attorney Martin Banks presented to the City Council a resolution he had 
drafted to schedule a special election for August 5, 2003 for purposes of 
proposing a change in Holladay's form of government to a council-
manager form. Holladay Preservation League's Motion to Dismiss, pp. 4-
5. 
4. Attorney Martin Banks represents Richard Beckstrand, a real estate 
developer who has developed commercial properties in the vicinity of 
Holladay City. Holladay Preservation League's Motion to Dismiss, pp. 4-
5. 
5. At a city council meeting on June 5, 2003, the Holladay City Council 
considered for adoption the resolution written by Mr. Banks and a similar 
1
 Due to the expedited nature of this proceeding, no record (other than transcripts of two motion hearings) 
has been prepared by the trial court. This brief will therefore cite, when necessary, to the parties' pleadings 
filed in the trial court. No factual issues were contested by any party in the trial court, and none are being 
challenged by Appellants on appeal. 
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resolution written by the City Attorney. Holladay Preservation League's 
Motion to Dismiss, pp. 4-5. 
6. At a city council meeting on June 19, 2003, the Holladay City Council, by 
a vote of 3-2, passed a resolution setting a special election for August 5, 
2003 to determine whether the City should adopt the council-manager 
form of municipal government. July 18, 2003 Order of Trial Court, p. 1. 
7. The Mayor was not given an opportunity by the City Council to approve 
or reject the resolution. Transcript of June 19, 2003 City Council Meeting 
(attached to City Council's Petition for Declaratory Judgment), p. 18. 
8. On July 2, 2003, the Petition for Declaratory Judgment was filed in the 
District Court below. July 18, 2003 Order of Trial Court, p. 2. 
9. On July 18, 2003, the District Court entered its final judgment in this 
matter. July 18, 2003 Order of Trial Court, p. 2. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Both the city council and the mayor of a Utah municipality operating under a 
council-mayor form of government must approve a resolution to place on the ballot at a 
special election the question of whether the municipality should adopt a different form of 
government. A few very straightforward statutes clearly establish this proposition. The 
evolution of the relevant statutes since 1975 demonstrate that such was the Legislature's 
intent. The trial court's contrary holding that the city council may unilaterally adopt such 
a resolution contravenes the clear statutory language and intent and undermines the 
principles of separation of powers and checks and balances on which the council-mayor 
form of government is based. 
The few statutory and policy arguments raised by the trial court and the appellees 
to overcome the clear import of the determinative statutes are insufficient to accomplish 
their objective. The fact that the mayor under a council-mayor form of government is not 
allowed to vote in city council meetings and that his veto powers are somewhat 
circumscribed by statute does not alter the conclusion that his approval is required to 
adopt a resolution proposing a change in form of government. Finally, existing Utah case 
law does not answer the question of first impression presented by this case, and does not 
change the conclusion dictated by the determinative statutes. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. IN A MUNICIPALITY OPERATING UNDER A COUNCIL-MAYOR 
FORM OF GOVERNMENT, A RESOLUTION CALLING A SPECIAL 
ELECTION TO PROPOSE ADOPTING A DIFFERENT FORM OF 
GOVERNMENT FOR THE MUNICIPALITY MUST BE PASSED BY 
BOTH THE CITY COUNCIL AND THE MAYOR. 
A. The Relevant Statutes Unmistakably Require Approval of the Resolution 
by Both the City Council and Mayor Acting as the Governing Body. 
1. Section 10-3-1203(3)(a) Requires that the Resolution be Passed by 
the City's "Governing Body." 
The Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act (Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1201 
et seq.) ("the Act") provides two methods by which the process of adopting an optional 
form of municipal government may be initiated: 
(1) A municipality may reorganize under any form of municipal government 
provided for in this part or under Section 10-3-103, 10-3-104, 10-3-105, or 10- 3-
106, regardless of the city's class under Section 10-2-301. 
(2) Reorganization under Subsection (1) shall be by approval of a majority of 
registered voters of the municipality voting in a special election held for that 
purpose. 
(3) (a) The proposal may be entered on the ballot by resolution passed by the 
governing body of the municipality or by initiative as provided for in Title 20A, 
Chapter 7, Part 5, Local Initiatives --Procedures. Utah Code Ami. § 10-3-1201.2 
Under this statute, a proposal to adopt a new form of government may be entered 
on the ballot by resolution passed by the governing body of the municipality or by 
initiative. In the instant case, no initiative was undertaken. Rather, the Holladay City 
2
 Effective May 5, 2003, the City of Holladay was reclassified by the Utah Legislature from a third-class 
city to a fourth-class city. See U.C.A. 10-2-301 (2003). Accordingly, many of the statutes in the Utah 
Municipal Code, including many of those cited in this Brief, are being amended to include references to the 
newly-created categories of fourth and fifth-class cities. Because the amended Code is not yet available, 
and because the addition of the fourth and fifth class language does not in any way affect the substantive 
operation of any applicable statutes, this Brief simply cites the most recent codified (pre-amendment) 
version of the Code. See also U.C.A. 10-2-303 (all prior statutes, ordinances, etc. remain applicable to a 
municipality despite its change in class). 
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Council, by a 3 to 2 vote, passed a resolution calling for a special election to decide 
whether the City of Holladay should adopt a council-manager form of government. 
Section 10-3-120l(3)(a) requires that the resolution be passed by "the governing 
body of the municipality." Notably, the statute does not require passage of the resolution 
by the "city council" or "municipal council" or the "legislative body" of the municipality. 
If the Utah Legislature had wished to, it could easily have used one of these alternative 
terms. Elsewhere in the Utah Municipal Code, the Legislature has done just that. For 
example, in section 10-2-405 et seq., the Legislature has given certain powers over 
annexation petitions to the "municipal legislative body." Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-405 et 
seq. If the Legislature had similarly employed the language "municipal legislative body" 
in section 10-3-1201(3)(a), the City Council's argument in this litigation would be 
correct: the mayor would have no role in approving a resolution calling an election to 
propose a change in form of government. But instead, the Legislature deliberately chose 
the plirase "governing body." As discussed immediately below, the "governing body" of 
a council-mayor municipality such as Holladay unquestionably includes the mayor. 
2. "Governing Body" is Defined as Both the City Council and the 
Mayor. 
Section 10-1-104 provides numerous definitions of terms used in "this title," 
meaning all of Title 10, the Utah Municipal Code. The definition of "governing body" 
reads as follows: 
"Governing body" means collectively the legislative body and the executive of 
any municipality. Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(3). 
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This sentence contains no exceptions, limitations, or caveats, and therefore applies in all 
instances. 
The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law which the reviewing 
court examines for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court. Toone v. Weber 
County, 57 P.3d 1079, 1081 (Utah 2002). In interpreting a statute, courts must look first 
to the plain language of the statute to discern the legislative intent. City of South Salt 
Lake v. Salt Lake County, 925 P.2d 954, 95/ (Utah 1996). Incredibly, the trial court did 
not discuss, cite, or even mention the all-important statutory definition contained in 
section 10-1-104(3). More than any other error, this failing gave rise to the trial court's 
incorrect decision in this case. Section 10-1-104(3) plainly provides that in all instances, 
"governing body" encompasses both the legislative body and the executive of a city. 
Accordingly, the requirement in section 10-3-120l(3)(a) that a resolution proposing a 
special election to change forms of government be passed by the "governing body" of the 
municipality means that both the city council and the mayor must pass the resolution. 
An additional statutory definition, this one found in the Optional Forms of 
Municipal Government Act within the Municipal Code, reinforces this requirement. 
Section 10-3-1209(l)(b) provides that the "municipal council" in a council-manager form 
of government "is considered to be the governing body of the municipality." Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-3-1209(l)(b). Tellingly, however, this same statute, in describing the 
municipal council as constituted under a council-mayor form of government such as 
3
 The next sentence of the definition establishes the default rule that "unless otherwise provided," the 
combined legislative/executive body under traditional forms of Utah municipal government, such as the 
city commission, the city council, or town council, is the governing body. Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(3). 
Because Holladay does not operate under a traditional form of government in which the executive and 
legislative functions are unified in one entity, but has instead adopted an optional form of government with 
formal separation of powers between the legislative and executive, this default rule does not apply. Thus, 
reverting to the first sentence of section 10-1-104(3), the governing body of Holladay is collectively the 
city council and mayor. 
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Holladay's, omits this description of the municipal council as the "governing body." 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1209(l)(a). This omission is obviously occasioned by the 
definition in section 10-1-104(3) of "governing body" as collectively the legislative and 
executive entities. In a council-manager form of government, the municipal council 
serves as both the legislative and executive entities, and hence is the governing body. In 
a council-mayor form of government, however, the municipal council and the mayor, 
representing respectively the legislative and executive branches, together comprise the 
"governing body." Hence, both are required to participate in passing a resolution 
proposing a change in form of government under section 10-3-1203(3)(a). 
B. The Statutory Evolution of the Optional Forms of Municipal Government 
Act Confirms that the Mayor Was Intended to Be Part of the Governing 
Body for Purposes of Passing a Resolution Proposing a Change in Form 
of Government. 
In 1977, the Utah Legislature had a perfect opportunity to adopt the position 
advocated by the Holladay City Council and the trial court in this case. The Legislature 
declined to do so, however, and thereby firmly established the mandate that the mayor 
must participate in passing a resolution to change from a council-mayor form of 
government to another form. 
The operative statute in this case, section 10-3-1203 (3)(a), was patterned after a 
provision in the Strong Mayor Form of Government Act, Utah Code Ann. § 10-6-76 et 
seq. (1959) (repealed) ("Strong Mayor Act"), which was in effect from 1959 to 1975. 
Under the Strong Mayor Act, a Utah municipality of the first or second class operating 
under a traditional form of Utah municipal government could adopt instead a "strong 
mayor" form of government by election called by "a resolution passed by the governing 
body of the city or by initiative." Utah Code Ann. § 10-6-102 (1959) (repealed). At the 
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time, there was, and could be, no confusion as to the identity of the "governing body" 
which would pass such a resolution, because, under all traditional forms of Utah 
government which might have considered adopting the strong mayor form, the governing 
body was a unified legislative/executive entity known as the board of commissioners. 
See Utah Code Ann. 10-6-5 (1953) (repealed) (board of commissioners in cities of the 
first and second class is "legislative and governing" body). 
In 1975, the Utah Legislature repealed the Strong Mayor Act and replaced it with 
the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act ("the Act"). Utah Code § 10-6-103 et 
seq., since repealed, reorganized and reenacted in part as Utah Code § 10-3-1201 et seq. 
Under the 1975 version of the Act, a Utah municipality of any class operating under a 
traditional form of government could adopt either a council-mayor or a council-manager 
form of government. As with the previous Strong Mayor Act, the new form of 
government was to be proposed "by resolution passed by the governing body of the 
municipality or by initiative." Utah Code Ann. § 10-6-106 (1975) (now amended slightly 
and reenacted as Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1203). Of utmost significance, the 1975 version 
of the Act added two definitions of "governing body" which are not present in today's 
version of the Act. Section 10-6-104(2) of the 1975 Act provided: 
"Governing body" means the legislative body of any city or town organized under 
this act. Utah Code Ann. § 10-6-104(2) (1975) (repealed). 
Section 10-6-113 provided: 
The municipal council of a municipality adopting an optional form of government 
provided for in this act shall be the governing body of that municipality and shall 
pass ordinances, appropriate funds, review municipal administration, and perform 
all duties that may be required of them by law. Utah Code Ann. § 10-6-113 
(1975) (repealed). 
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These sections proclaimed unequivocally that, under the 1975 version of the Act, 
the municipal council was deemed the "governing body" of both the council-mayor and 
the council-manager forms of government. Thus, as of 1975, the lower court's ruling in 
this case would have been correct: as the "governing body," the city council of a 
municipality operating under a council-mayor form of government had authority to 
unilaterally pass a resolution calling for a special election to change the municipality's 
form of government. 
This reality changed, however, in 1977. In that year, the Legislature amended, 
reorganized, and re-enacted vast sections of the Utah Municipal Code. In doing so, the 
Legislature deleted both definitions of "governing body" quoted immediately above 
(sections 10-6-104(2) and 10-6-113). In their place, the Legislature enacted the following 
two statutes: 
"Governing body" means collectively the legislative body and the executive of 
any municipality. Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(3). 
(1) (a) The optional form of government known as the council-mayor form vests 
the government of a municipality that adopts this form in two separate, 
independent, and equal branches of municipal government: the executive branch, 
consisting of a mayor and the administrative departments and officers; and the 
legislative branch, consisting of a municipal council. 
(b) The optional form known as the council-manager form vests the government 
of the municipality in a municipal council, which is considered to be the 
governing body of the municipality, and a manager appointed by the council. 
Utah Code Ann. 10-3-1209. 
As discussed in an earlier section of this brief, these two statutory definitions, 
enacted in 1977 and still present to this day, establish that in a council-mayor form of 
government, the mayor and council together comprise the governing body. What is 
noteworthy here for purposes of legislative intent, however, is that, in repealing the prior 
definitions and enacting the current ones, the Legislature did not see fit to alter the 
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requirements of section 10-3-1203, the operative statute in this case. Both before and 
after the 1977 amendment, section 10-3-1203 provided, and continues to provide, 
substantially as follows: 
(1) A municipality may reorganize under any form of municipal government 
provided for in this part or under Section 10-3-103, 10-3-104, 10-3-105, or 10- 3-
106, regardless of the city's class under Section 10-2-301. 
(2) Reorganization under Subsection (1) shall be by approval of a majority of 
registered voters of the municipality voting in a special election held for that 
purpose. 
(3) (a) The proposal may be entered on the ballot by resolution passed by the 
governing body of the municipality or by initiative as provided for in Title 20A, 
Chapter 7, Part 5, Local Initiatives -Procedures. 
Thus, despite its decision in 1977 to delete the prior definitions of "governing 
body" and to substitute a new definition of that term, the Legislature nevertheless left 
intact the requirement that a resolution calling an election to propose a new form of 
government must be passed by the "governing body." It strains credulity to think that the 
Legislature, in the midst of the largest revision and recodification of the Utah Municipal 
Code in history, simply overlooked the fact that it was changing the requirements for 
approval of a resolution proposing the adoption of a new form of government. Statutes 
should be interpreted so as not to render any terms superfluous. Salt Lake v. Roberts, 44 
P.3d 767, 773 (Utah 2002). In light of the fact that the Legislature in 1977 adopted new 
statutory definitions of "governing body," the most plausible interpretation of sections 
10-1-104, 10-3-1203, and 10-3-1209, and the interpretation which renders none of the 
statutes superfluous, is that after 1977, the mayor under a council-mayor form of 
government is required to participate in passage of a resolution proposing an election to 
consider adopting a new form of government. Such an interpretation is the only logical 
reading of these statutes and the history of their adoption. 
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It should also be noted that the interpretation urged in this matter by Appellants 
represents a limited holding: i.e., it applies only when a city which has already adopted an 
optional form of government (specifically, the council-mayor form) seeks to switch to 
another optional form. To the best of Appellants' knowledge, this limited issue is a 
question of first impression in Utah. Adopting Appellants' interpretation on this issue 
will not affect the passage of resolutions to change the form of government in the 
majority of Utah cities, which do not have a council-mayor form of government and 
hence have a unitary governing body. Adopting the interpretation urged by Appellees, 
however, will drastically alter the balance of power in cities operating under a mayor-
council form, as will be argued in the next section. 
C. The Trial Court's Holding that the City Council May Unilaterally 
Propose an Election to Abolish the Office of Mayor Is a Dangerous 
Conclusion That Does Not Comport with the Purposes of the Optional 
Forms of Municipal Government Act. 
The Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act was enacted to improve "the 
ability of Utah's local governments to respond effectively" to the "needs and desires" of 
citizens. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1202. One of the optional forms of government made 
available by the Act is the council-mayor form. The council-mayor form "is a true 
separation of powers form of government," Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022, 1027 
(Utah 1978), "framed in the image of the federal and state systems." Martindale, 581 
P.2datl024. 
A fundamental principle of the separation of powers built into the federal and 
state constitutions is the concept of checks and balances. Throughout the United States 
and Utah Constitutions, many powers are shared between branches to prevent any one 
branch from becoming too powerful and dominating the other branches. See U.S. 
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Constitution, passim; Utah Constitution, passim. In this way, both the integrity of the 
governmental structure and the liberty of citizens are preserved. See The Federalist, No. 
51. 
The trial court's holding in this case not only ignores the clear language of the 
relevant statutes, it also threatens to destroy entirely the checks and balances built into the 
council-mayor form of government. Under the council-mayor form, the mayor is given 
authority to veto certain actions of the council. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1214. Of course, 
this prospect has the potential to engender conflict between the branches. In the instant 
case, significant tension existed between the Holladay city council and mayor just prior to 
passage by the city council of the resolution in question. The mayor had publicly 
opposed projects and polices which three members of the city council supported. Those 
three city council members had publicly expressed their frustration with the mayor's 
opposition to their policies, and their hope that eliminating his position would help to end 
the stalemate. See Transcript of June 19, 2003 City Council Meeting (attached to City 
Council's Petition for Declaratory Judgment), 14-15. 
The potential for such acrimony always exists in a government based on 
separation of powers and checks and balances. In fact, such conflict is expected, even 
welcomed. "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition." The Federalist, No. 51. 
But what the trial court in this case failed to recognize is that, far from preserving the 
intended constitutional structure of city government, as the court purported, its holding 
actually removes the intended checks and balances and by so doing gives to the 
legislative branch an illegitimate, unfair weapon of domination over what is supposed to 
be an equal and coordinate branch of government. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1209(l)(a) 
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(under council-mayor form, legislative and executive are "two separate, independent, and 
equal branches of municipal government.") Under the trial court's holding, a city council 
upset with a mayor's intransigence can simply schedule an election to propose abolishing 
the mayor's office. The undisputed evidence suggests that that is exactly what happened 
in this case. Even if this weapon were not wielded by a city council, the mere threat of it 
would be enough to completely alter the relative balance of power between the branches, 
allowing the legislative branch to impose its will on the executive under duress. 
Interpreting section 10-3-1203(3)(a), then, to require approval by both the city 
council and the mayor of a resolution proposing a special election on adopting a new 
form of government is dictated not only by the clear language of the relevant statutes, but 
also by constitutional principles of separation of powers and checks and balances, 
principles which the Act was meant to reinforce. 
D. The Utah Election Code Confirms that the City Council May Not 
Unilaterally Schedule a Special Election Proposing a Change in the Form 
of Government. 
Additional authority that the city council under a council-mayor form of 
government may not schedule a special election proposing a change in form of 
government without the mayor's approval is found in section 20 A-1-203 of the Election 
Code: 
5) (a) The legislative body of a local political subdivision may call a local special 
election only for: 
(i) a vote on a bond or debt issue; 
(ii) a vote on a voted leeway program authorized by Section 53A-17a-133 or 53A-
17a-134; 
(iii) a referendum authorized by Title 20A, Chapter 7, Part 6; 
(iv) an initiative authorized by Title 20A, Chapter 7, Part 5; or 
(v) if required or authorized by federal law, a vote to determine whether or not 
Utah's legal boundaries should be changed. Utah Code Ann. 20A-1-203. 
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Under this explicit grant of authority to local legislative bodies to call special 
elections for certain enumerated purposes, a special election to change the municipality's 
form of government is not one of the permissible enumerated purposes. This fact is 
consistent with the statutory mandate contained in section 10-3-1203(3)(a) (discussed 
above) that only the governing body of the municipality may call a special election to 
change the form of government. If "governing body" in section 10-3-1203(3)(a) meant 
merely "legislative body," then the calling of a special election to change the form of 
government would have been listed as a permissible purpose in section 20A-1-203. The 
fact that it is not listed demonstrates that scheduling such an election requires approval by 
the full governing body, not just the legislative branch. 
The trial court attempted to explain away this omission in section 20A-1-203 by 
simply asserting that the authority of the city council to call a special election to change 
the form of government, while absent from this section, is nevertheless granted by section 
10-3-1203(3)(a). But this contention by the trial court completely evades answering the 
question posed by section 20 A-1-203: if the legislative branch is the governing body, 
why isn't an election to change the form of government listed in section 20A-1-203 as 
one of the permissible purposes for which the legislative body may call an election? The 
trial court gives no answer at all to this question, once again calling into doubt its 
interpretation of the phrase "governing body." 
II. NO PROVISION OR PRINCIPLE IN UTAH LAW NEGATES THE 
STATUTORY REQUIREMENT THAT THE MAYOR IN A COUNCIL-
MAYOR FORM OF GOVERNMENT MUST PARTICIPATE IN PASSAGE 
OF A RESOLUTION CALLING A SPECIAL ELECTION TO PROPOSE 
ADOPTING A DIFFERENT FORM OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE 
MUNICIPALITY. 
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A. The Prohibition Against the Mayor Voting in Council Meetings Is 
Immaterial. 
The trial court held that the mayor in a council-mayor form of government has no 
role to perform in passing a resolution calling a special election to adopt a new form of 
government because, by law, "the mayor may not vote in council meetings." Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-3-1219(g). See July 18, 2003 Order at 5. The court's analysis is flawed in 
several respects. First, it is a settled rule of statutory construction that "more specific 
provisions take precedence over and control more general provisions." State v. Webster, 
32 P.3d 976, 989 (Utah 2001). Section 10-3-1203(3)(a) requires that a resolution 
proposing a change in form of government be passed by the "governing body" of the 
municipality. "Governing body" is defined as "collectively the legislative body and the 
executive of any municipality." Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(3). Section 10-3-1219(g), 
which prohibits the mayor from voting in council meetings, is a general statute that has 
nothing to do with the adoption of a new form of government. Because section 10-3-
1203 contains a specific requirement for passage of a resolution to change the form of 
government, it takes precedence over section 10-3-1219(g) to the extent the two statutes 
conflict. Section 10-3-1219(g) deals simply with run-of-the-mill, everyday decisions of 
the city council over which the mayor will typically have veto power anyway. For those 
decisions, it makes sense that the mayor would not be allowed to vote. The adoption of a 
resolution to change the form of government, however, is a matter of a completely 
different nature and magnitude, for which the statutes specifically require the mayor to 
participate in deciding as a member of the governing body. 
Second, even if section 10-3-1219(g) does apply to the city council's 
consideration of a resolution to change the form of government, there is no reason the 
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mayor, in exercising his or her authority to pass on the resolution, must do so by "voting 
in a council meeting." The mayor's decision on the resolution can be rendered outside a 
city council meeting and therefore not implicate section 10-3-1219(g). 
Finally, section 10-3-1219(n) grants the mayor authority "to perform other duties 
as may be prescribed by this part." Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1219(n). This section gives a 
mayor power to do what is necessary to fulfill his or her responsibilities specified in "this 
part," meaning Utah Code Title 10, Chapter 3, Part 12, the Optional Forms of Municipal 
Government Act. One of the mayor's responsibilities imposed by the Act is to participate 
in considering a resolution proposing a new form of government as a member of the 
governing body. Section 10-3-1219(n) therefore overrides section 10-3-1219(g) and 
allows the mayor to vote on the resolution. The trial court incorrectly quoted section 10-
3-1219(n) in addressing this argument below, holding that the statute only grants powers 
"not inconsistent with Part 12." July 18, 2003 Order. This is incorrect. The statute 
grants power to perform "other duties as may be prescribed by this part or may be 
required by ordinance not inconsistent with this part." Because no "ordinance 
inconsistent with this part" is at issue here, the final clause of the statute is inapplicable to 
this case. The statute simply gives the mayor authority "to perform other duties as may 
be prescribed by this part," which duties include approving or disapproving a resolution 
to change the form of government. 
B. The Lack of Specific Mayoral Veto Power Over the Resolution is 
Irrelevant 
The trial court held that the mayor in a council-mayor form of government may 
not stop the city council from passing a resolution proposing an election on a new form of 
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government because the mayor lacks specific veto power to do so. The trial court erred 
in so holding. 
First, the action to be taken by the mayor on the resolution proposing a new form 
of government need not be characterized as a veto. Section 10-3-1203(3)(a) simply 
provides that the mayor, as a member of the governing body, must be involved in the 
passage of the resolution in the first instance. Hence, this is an original duty, and not a 
veto action. 
Second, the trial court's statement that the mayor is not given specific veto 
authority over the change of form resolution overlooks the fact that the city council itself 
is never given specific authority to pass such a resolution in the first place. Section 10-3-
1210, which defines the city council's powers under the council-mayor form of 
government, provides as follows: 
The municipal council of a municipality adopting an optional form of government 
provided for in this part shall pass ordinances, appropriate funds, review 
municipal administration, and perform all duties that may be required of it by law. 
Utah Code Ann. 10-3-1210. 
Nowhere is the power to pass resolutions, let alone a resolution to change the form of 
government, mentioned therein as a power of the city council. If one desired, one could 
just as easily imply a power on the part of the mayor to veto such a resolution as imply a 
power by the council to pass such a resolution. 
Next, the trial court erred in interpreting section 10-3-404 as necessarily 
precluding mayoral veto authority over a change-in-form resolution. Section 10-3-404, 
as well as sections 10-3-401 through 403, are meant to apply to traditional forms of Utah 
local government and do not apply to optional forms of municipal government. This 
conclusion is dictated by the fact that all of these statutes are inconsistent with various 
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features of optional forms of municipal government. For example, section 10-3-401 
provides that "the mayor shall vote as a member of the governing body." Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-3-401. This is obviously untrue of, and hence inapplicable to, optional forms 
of municipal government. Similarly, section 10-3-404 provides that: 
The mayor of any municipality shall have no power to veto any act of the 
governing body unless otherwise specifically authorized by statute. Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-3-404. 
This statute is clearly inapplicable to optional forms of municipal government. 
First, it cannot apply to the council-manager form, because such a form has no mayor. 
Second, it also does not apply to the council-mayor form, because the statute speaks of 
the mayor vetoing an act of the "governing body." Although such language makes 
perfect sense when applied to the traditional form of Utah government in which the 
council and a non-voting, non-vetoing mayor constitute the governing body, the language 
is completely unintelligible when applied to the council-mayor optional form of 
government, because the mayor himself is part of the governing body whom the statute 
ostensibly prevents him from vetoing. In order to apply to the council-mayor form, the 
statute would have to read "the mayor shall have no power to veto any act of the 
municipal council," but it does not so read. Hence, it does not apply to the council-mayor 
form of government, and thus the possibility that the mayor could in fact "veto" a 
resolution to change the form of government remains open. 
Finally, the fact that section 10-3-1214 does not list a change-in-form resolution 
as an item that may be vetoed by the mayor under a council-mayor form of government 
still does not preclude the possibility that a veto of such a resolution could still be validly 
exercised. This is because section 10-3-1203(3)(a) requires the mayor, as a member of 
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the governing body, to participate in passing the resolution. Section 10-3-1203(3)(a) 
could therefore act itself as an authorization of veto power for a change-in-form 
resolution. 
In summary, the mayor's required participation, as a part of the governing body, 
in passing a resolution proposing a change in form of government, can either be 
characterized as an original action, in which case no veto power is necessary, or as a veto 
power, in which case no applicable statutes preclude its exercise. 
C. Labeling the Passage of a Resolution to Change the Form of Government 
as a "Policymaking Function" Does Not Answer the Question of Who Is 
Statutorily-Required to Approve the Resolution. 
The trial court briefly held that because the passage of a resolution is a 
"policymaking function," the Mayor is not required to participate in approving a 
resolution to change the form of government. July 18, 2003 Order, p. 8. This holding 
begs the very question it seeks to answer and flies in the face of the clear language of the 
statute. 
The trial court cited Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978) for the 
proposition that "legislative powers are policy making powers, while executive powers 
are policy execution powers." Martindale, 581 P. 2d at 1027. The Court then went on to 
hold that the mayor had no power to participate in passing the resolution to change forms 
of government because doing so was a policymaking power. July 18, 2003 Order, p. 8. 
The fatal error in this holding is that, even after one describes legislative powers 
as policymaking and executive powers as policyexecuting, one is still no closer to 
determining who is required to approve a resolution to change the form of a city's 
government. The trial court could give this problem short shrift only because the court 
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completely ignored and failed to mention the most important statute for deciding this 
case: the definition of "governing body" in section 10-1-104(3) as including both the 
legislative and executive branches. In the face of such an unambiguous statute, the 
attempt to draw a distinction between policymaking and policy-executing powers in order 
to decide this case must fail, for several reasons. 
First, Martindale was not concerned with, and never discussed, the issue 
presented by this case of the proper requirements for passing a change-in-form resolution. 
Martindale simply held that certain administrative functions, such as subdivision 
approval, were reserved for the mayor. Martindale, 581 P. 2d at 1029. 
Second, the policymaking/policy-execution dichotomy may prove too little in this 
case. Even such an important function as normal day-to-day legislative policymaking, 
typically reserved for the legislative branch, pales in comparison to the importance of 
adopting a new governmental structure for an entire city. It is entirely possible that, 
given the importance of the issue, the Utah Legislature wanted to include even more 
players in reaching such a decision than the standard policymakers in the legislative 
branch. Altering the form of government is the most original, fundamental, formative act 
that can be taken by a democracy. It may be compared to adopting a constitutional 
amendment. Typically when constitutional amendments are proposed, the proposals 
require passage by supermajorities of representatives. See U.S. Const., art. V. Because 
under the Utah Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act only a bare minimum of 
the city council is required to approve a resolution calling for a change in form of 
government, it is quite plausible that the Legislature intended, in a council-mayor form of 
government, to require passage of the proposal by the mayor as well as the council, as a 
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type of supermajority requirement. This especially true in light of the fact that the 
adoption by the City Council of a resolution proposing an election to change the form of 
government means that the Council has deliberately chosen not to allow the citizens of 
the City to pursue the change in government themselves through the initiative process, 
which is the other available, and more democratic, mechanism by which such a change 
can occur. 
Finally, even if one believes that the decision to adopt a change in government 
resolution is purely a policymaking function and hence within the purview of the 
legislative branch, nevertheless, under the council-mayor form of government, standard 
policymaking decisions are subject to a policymaking veto by the mayor. Even under the 
policymaking model then, the mayor would still have the right to approve or reject the 
proposal. 
CONCLUSION 
The question presented in this appeal is easily answered by reference to a few 
unambiguous statutes. Section 10-3-1203(3)(a) requires the "governing body" to pass a 
resolution placing on the ballot a proposal for a change in the form of municipal 
government. Section 10-1-104 defines "governing body" as collectively the legislative 
body and the executive of the municipality. The Utah Legislature had a clear opportunity 
in 1977 to alter this definition and failed to do so. The trial court's holding that the city 
council can unilaterally approve a resolution proposing an election to change the city's 
form of government is therefore incorrect and undermines U.S. and Utah principles of 
separation of powers and checks and balances. 
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The objections raised by the appellees against this unambiguous interpretation are 
insufficient. None of the statutes or cases cited by the trial court or by the appellees can 
disturb the conclusion that under a council-mayor form of government, the mayor must 
consent to a resolution calling a special election to adopt a new form of government. The 
judgment of the trial court should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ 3 L 5 ^ j l a y of /ju« VS t~ 
2003. 
TESCH GRAHAM P.C. 
Joseph E. Tesch' 
Kraig J. Powell 
Attorneys for Holladay Preservation League 
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IN RESOLUTION NO. 03-034 
AUGUST 5, 2003 
SPECIAL ELECTION 
CASE #030914851 
Tim COURT ORDERS THAT ANY FUTURE FILLINGS IN THIS CASE BE STYLED: 
COUNCIL OF IIOLLADAY CITY, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
MAYOR DENNIS LARKIN, 
Respondent 
JUL-18-03 FRI 10:14 AM 3RD DISTRICT COURT FAX NO. 801 238 7074 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN RE: RESOLUTION NO. 03-34 
AUGUST 5,2003 
SPECIAL ELECTION 
ORDER 
CASE NO. 0309 14851 
JUDGE L.A. DEVER 
This matter came before the above entitled Court pursuant to Interveners' Motion 
To Intervene, Mayor Dennis Larkin's Motion To Dismiss, Intervenor Holladay 
Preservation League's Motion To Dismiss and Holladay City's Petition For Declaratory 
Judgment. Oral arguments were held on July 15,2003, after which the Court took the 
matter under advisement. Now, having fully considered the arguments of counsel, the 
memoranda submitted by the parties and the relevant legal authority the Court rules as 
stated herein. 
I. Background 
The relevant facts are as follows: On June 19,2003, the Holladay City Council 
approved, by majority vote, Resolution 03-34, calling for a special election to determine 
whether Holladay City should change its current form of government from a "council-
mayor* form to a 'council-manager" form. Voting on the resolution is slated for a 
Special Election to be held on August 5,2003. 
P. 03/12 
JUL-IWK M I iu:i4 m m DISTINCT UUUKT
 m m m 238 m p> 
In Re Resolution Page 2 Order 
03-34 
A week after passage of the resolution, on June 27,2003, the Mayor of 
Holladay, Dennis Larkin, wrote a letter to the City Council purporting to vote against and 
ultimately veto the Council's resolution. Consistent with his attempt to veto the 
resolution, Mayor Larkin excised alf funds earmarked for the election and suspended 
City Administrator Jerry Medina, the individual in charge of election preparations. 
The City Council reviewed the Mayor's action and voted on July 10,2003, to 
reinstate the funds for the election, The vote was unanimous. 
In response to the Mayor's action relating to the election itself, the City of 
Holladay filed a "Petition For Declaratory Judgment" Petitioners are joined by 
Intervener Holladay Citizens For Progress. Mayor Larkin, by and through counsel, filed 
a Motion To Dismiss. The mayor is joined by Intervener, Holladay Preservation 
League. 
II. MOTIONS TO INTERVENE 
Holladay Citizens For Progress and Holladay Preservation League's Motions To 
Intervene are granted. Relying upon Section 78-33-11 of Utah's4 Declaratory Judgment 
Act, both sets of intervenors shall be allowed to intervene based upon their claims of an 
"interest which would be affected by the declaration.". 
JUL JO vo riu wiv mi om, v W m n / 1 W U U I r_A 
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III. MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
Mayor Larkin and Intervenor Holladay Preservation League both argue that the 
current matter should be dismissed based upon the Court's lack of jurisdiction and 
Holladay City's failure to name necessary parties. As to the first argument, this Court 
concludes that it has jurisdiction over the pending matter pursuant to Section 7B-33-1 of 
Utah's Declaratory Judgment Act. Specifically, the Declaratory Judgment Act provides 
this Court with jurisdiction to determine whether or not Mayor Larkin has the authority to 
prevent the election from proceeding by opposing or by vetoing the resolution. The 
current posture of this case is ripe for declaratory action. 
Second, the parties argue that the petition fails to name any parties against 
whom relief is requested. While the heading of the action does not denominate the 
parties, the body of the petition does identify them. The Court finds that the proper 
parties have been named and placed on notice. Additionally, it is not disputed that 
Mayor Larkin received and signed an acceptance of service of the petition for 
declaratory relief. 
For these reasons, the Motions to Dismiss are denied. 
IV. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
With respect to Holladay City's "Petition For Declaratory Judgment", two main 
issues are currently before the Court: 1) can Mayor LarWn vote against or veto 
Resolution 03-34; and 2) can the Holladay City Council call for a special election via 
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passage of a resolution? 
A, Can Mavor Larkin Vote Against And/Or Veto The Resolution? 
As an initial issue, the parties encourage the Court to define the term "governing 
body." Indeed, a majority of the parties' arguments focus on utilizing principles of 
statutory construction to determine whether the mayor, along with the City Council, Is a 
member of the governing body and thereby entitled to vote against the resolution. 
Utah Code Ann, § 10-3-105 defines the term governing body for those third class 
cities1 which have not adopted an optional form of government. That section further 
states that the third class cities which have adopted an optional form of government, 
such as HoHaday, 8re governed by the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act, 
UCA§ 10*3-1201 et.seq. 
Section 10-3-1209 of the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act states 
that: 
^Effective May 5,2003, the City of HoHaday was reclassified by the Utah 
Legislature from a third class city to a fourth class city. However, because the 
amended Code, which incorporates the newly created categories of forth and fifth class 
cities, will not affect the substantive operation of any applicable statutes, this Order 
relies upon and cites the most recent codified version of the Code. 
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[t]he opti6naI form of government known as the council-mayor form 
vests the government of a municipality that adopts this form in two 
separate, independent, and equal branches of municipal government; 
the executive branch, consisting of a mayor and the administrative 
departments and officers; and the legislative branch, consisting of a 
municipal council 
This section designates the executive and legislative branches as separate, but 
equal and independent branches of municipal government. Mayor Larkin and 
Intervenor Holladay Preservation League rely heavily upon this provision along with 
Section 10-3-1203 which states, In relevant part, that reorganization of municipal 
government "may be entered on the ballot by resolution passed by the governing body 
of the municipality/ The Mayor and the League claim these provisions show that 
Mayor Larkin as a member of the separate but equal executive branch has the authority 
to vote against and veto the resolution. 
The Court, however, is unable to accept the Mayor and Holladay Preservation 
League's interpretation of the Act without considering several additional provisions. 
These additional provisions recognize that the authority of both the legislative and 
executive branches Is not unfettered. In fact, the Legislature has placed specific and 
explicit limitations upon a mayor's authority which must be considered. 
The first limitation is set forth in Section 10-3-1219, which generally addresses 
the powers and duties of a mayor under a council-mayor form of government, Of 
specific relevance is the prohibition set forth in subsection (g) which states that "the 
mayor may not vote in council meetings." Thus, while a mayor does have the 
authority to do those acts enumerated under Section 10-3-1219, his power is limited 
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such that he may not vote at a city council meeting. According to the plain language of 
the statute, Mayor Larkin does not have the authority tovote on the Resolution, Finally, 
the Court notes that even /Tthe Mayor had the authority to vote on the resolution, which 
the Court concludes he does not, he failed to vote at the June 19,.2003, City Council 
meeting and has, therefore, waived any right to do so now. 
The City argues that the Mayor cannot veto the Resolution. The Court has 
previously determined that Part 12 of Chapter 3, Optional Forms of Municipal 
Government, is the primary source to be reviewed to determine what authority is 
granted to the Council and the Mayor, The Legislature in section 1219 outlines the 
powers and duties of the Mayor, Nowhere In that section is the Mayor granted the right 
to "veto" any action of the Council. Section 1214, however, does address the authority 
of the Mayor to disapprove actions of the Council. According to section 1214, that right 
to disapprove is limited to ordinances and tax levies and appropriations. No other 
authority to disapprove actions of the Council is granted. CouncJI for the League argues 
that 1219 (2)(n) can be used as a catchall section by the Court to justify the Mayor's 
right to "veto" the Resolution. The Court does agree that (2)(n) is a catchall but it only 
grants the right to perform other duties not Inconsistent with Part 12. A veto of the 
Resolution would be inconsistent with the rights and duties granted to the Mayor by 
statute. 
Additionally, Section 1204 provides that "[a]li existing statutes governing 
municipalities shall remain applicable except as provided in this part." Section 10-3-404 
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 u o r i w | W I 1 ( | „, u i u / „ i u 
u u
' 'nn "w« oui c^u , u l n r^ u o / . 
In Re Resolution Page 7 Order 
03-34 
states *tt]he mayor of any municipality shall have no power to veto any act of the 
governing body unless specifically authorized by statute.' Council for the League 
argues that all of part 4 should be inapplicable to cities organized under part 12. The 
Court agrees that sections 401*403 are inconsistent with the provisions of part 12. 
However, section 404 contain nothing inconsistent with part 12 and therefore can be 
considered as an additional basis to support the proposition that a mayor only has veto 
powers as authorized by statute. The Court has found no authority in the statutes 
granting Mayor Larkin such a power. 
B. Must The Mayor Approve The Resolution? 
The Mayor and the League argue that the Court should interpret governing body 
as a singular term and find that the Mayor and the Council must operate as one and 
both pass and/or approve the resolution. The Court finds nothing in the statute that 
supports this interpretation. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (1978), does 
give some guidance on powers granted to the two branches under the Optional Forms 
of Government Act The Court stated that 
We agree with the conclusion that the Council is vested with 
all legislative powers, and find full support for it in those provisions 
of the Act which specifically deprive the Mayor of Council membership 
or a vpte thereon. 
Simply stated, legislative powers are policy making powers, while 
executive powers are policy execution powers. 
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The Act, by direct implication, confers policy-making functions \ ^  uco-
upon the Counci l . . . . <&£ e otj^-
K 
Martindale at 1027. J ^ °*y jf 
'0 The passing of a resolution is clearly a legislative or policy-making function and, 
i. \ as such, the authority to do so rests with the Council and not the Mayor. Therefore, the 
u 
v & "governing body" in section 10-3-1203 (3)(a) must mean the legislative branch since the 
^ ^ Mayo* has no authority to veto and has no authority for policy-making. 
^ & if Even if you accept the Mayor's view that he has the right to approve or withhold 
,^ v a. $ approval, he clearly gave It when he stated In the Council meeting oil June 16,2003, 
f <J* x "Anyhow, I will abide by the decision of the Council. If you want to put it on the ballot, 
let's do It." Holladay City Council Minutes, June19,2003, pg 17, lines 30-31 
C . Can The City Council Call A Special Election? 
The final Issue to be addressed is whether UCA § 20A-1-203 limits the Council's 
ability to call a special election via a resolution, provided that such an election is not 
specifically enumerated under that statute.2 While UCA § 20A-1-203 does not address 
2UCA § 20A-1-203(5)(a) states in relevant part, 
[t]he legislative body of a local political subdivision may call a local special 
election only for. 
(i) a vote on a bond or debt issue; (ii) a vote on a voted leeway program authorized by Section 53A-
17a-133or53A-17a-134; (lii) a referendum authorized by Title 20A, Chapter 7, Part 6; (lv) an initiative authorized by Title 20A, Chapter 7, Part S; or 
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the Council's's ability to call a special election by resolution, the Court relies upon the 
Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act, UCA § 10-3-1201 et. seq. Specifically, 
Section 10-3-1206(3)(a) of the Act states that the proposal for reorganization of a 
municipal government "may be entered on the ballot by resolution passed by the 
governing body of the municipality or by Initiative." Furthermore, UCA § 10-3-1204 of 
the Act states that H[a]II existing statutes governing municipalities shall remain 
applicable except as provided in this part (Emphasis added). Read together these two 
provisions provide the City Council with the power to call a special election by 
Resolution and clarify any apparent inconsistency the Act's provisions may appear to 
have with UCA § 20A-1-203. 
As mentioned in the previous section the Court interprets "governing body" for 
purposes of UCA 10-3-1203(3)(a) as that portion of the governing body that has the 
authority to vote on or pass an Initiative—the City Council and not the mayor. 
V. Conclusion 
in conclusion, while the council-mayor form of government vests the power 
(v) If required by federal law, a vote to determine whether or not 
Utah's legal boundaries should be changed. 
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between .the executive and legislative branches, that power is not unfettered. Specific 
limitations set forth in the Act prohibit Mayor Larkin from voting on, disapproving or 
withholding approval of, or vetoing the resolution. 
Furthermore, the Holladay City Council has the authority to call a special election 
via Resolution 03-34 and therefore the ejection shall proceed as scheduled on August 
S, 2003. 
This is the final Order of the Court and no further Order is necessary. 
Dated this i f e - day of July, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
L A DEVER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In re HOLLADAY CITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION NO. 03-34 
MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 0309014851 
Honorable L.A. Dever 
COMES NOW INTERVENOR HOLLADAY PRESERVATION LEAGUE, by 
and through its counsel of record TESCH GRAHAM P . C , and moves to dismiss this 
action pursuant to Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or in the alternative, moves 
for entry of summary judgment against Petitioner. For the reasons in support of this 
Motion, please see the accompanying Memorandum. 
Due to the extreme shortness of time allowed for the formation of issues, study, 
research and drafting of the Memorandum prior to hearing, the Holladay Preservation 
League also incorporates all of the following issues in this Motion: 
1. All of the issues raised by the pleadings of the Mayor of Holladay; 
2. All of the Preservation League's procedural issues raised previously; and 
3. All of the Preservation League's objections set forth on the record July 7, 
2003. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ' day of July, 2003. 
TESCH GRAHAM P.C. 
Joseph E. Tesch 
Kraig J. Powell 
Attorneys for Holladay Preservation League 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In re HOLLADAY CITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION NO. 03-34 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 0309014851 
Honorable L.A. Dever 
INTRODUCTION 
Obviously, the circumstances and posture of this case are extraordinary. No 
parties have been named as plaintiffs or defendants. No summonses have been issued. 
No causes of action have been pled. No order has been requested. Under such 
conditions, citizens of Holladay, Utah interested in the subject matter of the Petition for 
Declaratory Judgment ("Petition") filed in this case, such as the members of Intervenor 
Holladay Preservation League ("Preservation League"), are lefl with little or no guidance 
as to how to advance and defend their interests in this matter consistent with the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Despite these serious defects of the Petition, the great 
significance of the facts recited therein has led the Preservation League to request that it 
be allowed to intervene in this action. For all of the reasons set forth below, the 
Preservation League now moves that the Petition be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or in the alternative, that summary judgment be entered 
against Petitioner. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On June 19, 2003, the City Council of the City of Holladay passed 
Resolution Number 03-34 ("the Resolution") scheduling a special election 
for August 5, 2003 to propose reorganization of the City of Holladay 
under a council-manager form of government. 
2. The City of Holladay is presently governed by a council-mayor form of 
government. 
3. The Mayor of the City of Holladay has not approved the Resolution. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PETITION MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT FAILS TO NAME ANY 
PARTIES AGAINST WHOM RELIEF IS REQUESTED. 
Under Rule 12(b), a claim may be dismissed for the following reasons (among 
others): lack of jurisdiction over the person, insufficiency of process, insufficiency of 
service of process, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and failure to 
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join an indispensable party. The Petition filed in this case on its face violates each of 
these requirements. 
By failing to name any defendants, and also by failing to request that relief be 
entered against any party, Petitioner has not met the most fundamental requirements for 
commencing a civil action. The fact that an action is filed as a declaratory judgment 
action does not obviate the need for the naming and service of parties defendant. On the 
contrary, section 78-33-11 of the Utah Declaratory Judgments Act requires that "all 
persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by 
the declaration." Utah Code Annotated § 78-33-11. 
Petitioner's failure to follow these procedural formalities in commencing this 
action has caused, and continues to cause, prejudice to the interests of the Preservation 
League. Because no parties were named and no relief was requested in the Petition, the 
Preservation League was unable to adequately prepare for the in camera conference with 
the Court held July 7, 2003. The Preservation League continues to be uncertain as to the 
real parties in interest to this action and the potential legal consequences, if any, of the 
case. The Preservation League contends that, at a minimum, the Mayor and City Council 
of the City of Holladay should have been named as parties to this action. The proper 
naming of such parties and the ensuing service of summons(es) would have set in motion 
a process for answering upon which the Preservation League could have relied to define 
the issues in the case and identify the alignment of its interests. Naming of parties in this 
manner also would have led to the filing of motions requesting relief against specific 
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parties, which in turn would have triggered rights of time periods to respond and reply. 
The failure to follow such procedural requirements violates the Preservation League's 
rights of due process to participate meaningfully in this action and mandates dismissal of 
the Petition. Although the Preservation League will proceed to address to what it 
understands to be the substantive issues and ramifications of this case, the Preservation 
League does not thereby waive any of the aforementioned errors of Petitioner in 
commencing this action. 
II. THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF HOLLADAY IS A MEMBER OF THE 
GOVERNING BODY OF THE CITY AND THEREFORE HIS APPROVAL IS 
REQUIRED IN ORDER TO PASS THE RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A 
SPECIAL ELECTION TO CHANGE THE FORM OF CITY GOVERNMENT. 
Utah Code Annotated section 10-3-1203 states that a proposal to change a 
municipality's form of government may be entered on the ballot at a special election by 
citizen initiative petition or by a "resolution passed by the governing body of the 
municipality." UCA 10-3-1203(3)(a). No citizen initiative petition was submitted in the 
current HoUaday matter. Instead, on June 19,2003, the HoUaday City Council voted 3 to 
2 in favor of a resolution calling for a special election to propose changing HoUaday's 
form of government from a council-mayor form to a council-manager form. Although 
the resolution voted on by the City Council on June 19, 2003 was written by the City 
Attorney, the original version of the resolution calling for the election, which was 
considered by the City Council at its previous meeting on June 5, 2003, was written and 
submitted to the City Council by Martin K. Banks, an attorney of the law firm Stoel 
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Rives representing Holladay-area real estate developer Richard Beckstrand. See Minutes 
of June 5, 2003 City Council Meeting (in custody of Petitioner) and fax cover sheet of 
Resolution sent to City Council members attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
Utah Code Annotated section 10-3-1209(l)(b) states that "the optional form [of 
government] known as the council-manager form vests the government of the 
municipality in a municipal council, which is considered to be the governing body of the 
municipality, and a manager appointed by the council." UCA 10-3-1209(l)(b). The 
previous paragraph of the same statute, however, in describing the contrasting council-
mayor form of government, under which Holladay currently operates, does not state that 
the municipal council is the governing body under the council-mayor form. Instead, it 
states that "the optional form of government known as the council-mayor form vests the 
government of a municipality that adopts this form in two separate, independent, and 
equal branches of municipal government: the executive branch, consisting of a mayor 
and the administrative departments and officers; and the legislative branch, consisting of 
a municipal council." UCA 10-3-1209(l)(a). The presence of the phrase "a municipal 
council, which is considered to be the governing body of the municipality" in section 
(l)(b) describing the council-manager form, and the absence of that phrase from section 
(l)(a) describing the council-mayor form, demonstrates that in a council-mayor 
government, the city council is not the governing body, or else the Legislature would 
have simply used the same language in 1(a) as in 1(b). 
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Additional, decisive statutory authority that both the mayor and city council in a 
council-mayor form of government together comprise the governing body is found in 
Utah Code section 10-1-104: '"Governing body' means collectively the legislative and 
the executive of any municipality." UCA 10-104. Because section 10-3-1209 (l)(a) 
(quoted above) describes the legislative branch as the city council and the executive 
branch as the mayor, it is clear that in a council-mayor form of government, such as 
Holladay's, the mayor and the council together make up the governing body. 
It should also be noted that when the Utah Legislature wishes to refer to the 
legislative branch of municipal government alone, it knows how to do so. For example, 
section 10-2-405 and neighboring sections, in discussing annexation powers, refer 
repeatedly to the "legislative body" of a municipality. Similarly, the Election Code in 
section 20A-1-203 refers to the election powers possessed by the "legislative body" of a 
local political subdivision. If the Legislature had intended for only the "legislative body" 
to pass the resolution calling for the change in form of government, it clearly could have 
said so. Instead, it used the phrase "governing body" deliberately and highly specifically. 
Certain statutes in the Utah Municipal Code do describe the city council as the 
"governing body" of a municipality. These statutes do not affect in any way the fact that 
Holladay's governing body is both the mayor and council collectively, and it is extremely 
crucial to understand why. Section 10-3-105 provides that "the governing body of each 
city of the third class that has not adopted an optional form of government under Part 12, 
Alternative Forms of Municipal Government Act, shall be a council composed of six 
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members, one of whom shall be the mayor and the remaining five shall be council 
members." UCA 10-3-105 (emphasis added).1 This provision does not apply to 
Holladay because Holladay has adopted an optional form of government (the council-
mayor form) under the statute mentioned. 
Similarly, section 10-1-104(3) states that "unless otherwise provided, in a city of 
the third-class, the governing body is the city council." UCA 10-1-104(3) (emphasis 
added). The sentence immediately preceding this in the statute, however, states (as 
mentioned previously) that: "Governing body means collectively the legislative body 
and the executive of any municipality." UCA 10-1-104(3). It is clear then, that the 
phrase "unless otherwise provided" in 10-1-104(3) contemplates other situations, such as 
the adoption of alternative forms of government, thus echoing the exception from section 
10-3-105 (see above). When read in totality, then, all of the above-quoted statutes 
establish beyond a doubt that in the alternative form of government known as the council-
mayor form, the governing body is the executive (mayor) and legislature (city council) 
collectively. 
The above analysis means that in any other form of government besides that 
which Holladay currently has, the Holladay City Council would have been perfectly 
1
 Effective May 5, 2003, the City of Holladay was reclassified by the Utah Legislature from a third-class 
city to a fourth-class city. Accordingly, many of the statutes in the Utah Municipal Code, including many 
of those cited in this Memorandum, are being amended to include references to the newly-created 
categories of fourth and fifth-class cities. Because the amended Code is not yet available, and because the 
addition of the fourth and fifth class language does not in any way affect the substantive operation of any 
applicable statutes, this Memorandum simply cites the most recent codified (pre-amendment) version of the 
Code. See also UCA 10-2-303 (all prior statutes, ordinances, etc. remain applicable to a municipality 
despite its change in class). 
7 
within its rights to pass the resolution and schedule the special election to propose 
changing the City's form of government. But the City Council is not allowed to do so 
under Holladay's current form of government. This may seem as simply an incredibly 
bad piece of luck for the current Holladay City Council, but upon reflection, the purpose 
behind this differential treatment is obvious, as well as eminently logical and essential. 
In any other form of Utah government besides the council-mayor form, the 
executive and legislative powers are combined - there is no separate executive. See 
Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022,1024 (Utah 1978). Therefore, there is no 
counterweight authority to the City Council whose approval must be obtained. But in a 
council-mayor form of government, which is also known as the "strong-mayor" form, the 
executive is a "separate, independent, and equal" branch of government (UCA 10-3-
1209; see also Martindale, 581 P.2d at 1024), much like the U.S. President. It would be 
absurd to think that the U.S. Congress could unilaterally vote to hold an election to 
propose abolishing the office of President. Such a provision would be an overwhelming 
weapon of domination by one branch against another. It is similarly absurd to think that 
a city council in a strong mayor form of government can unilaterally vote to hold an 
election to propose abolishing the office of mayor. Such a provision would be a 
guaranteed recipe for tyranny of one branch over the other. Whenever conflict and 
tension between the two branches was high, the city council could simply eliminate the 
mayor's opposition by arranging to eliminate the mayor completely. The history and 
statements of City Council members in the current controversy in Holladay show that in 
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fact that is exactly what is now occurring. The members of the City Council who voted 
for the resolution calling for a vote on a change in form of government have stated on the 
record that they did so to overcome the stalemate caused by their conflicts with the 
mayor. See Transcripts of June 5, 2003 and June 19, 2003 Holladay City Council 
Meetings, in custody of Petitioner. Allowing such a result, however, would not be 
consistent with the American doctrines of separation of powers and checks and balances. 
Fortunately, allowing such a result also is not consistent with the Utah statutes and case 
law on this subject, as shown in detail above. Those statutes and cases, as well as 
common sense and logic, conclusively dictate that, absent a citizen initiative petition 
(which is always an option, and which could have been used instead for the current 
Holladay change of government proposal, and which can still be used if anyone desires), 
only a resolution passed by both the city council and the mayor can authorize an election 
to propose a change in a council-mayor form of government. Since the current resolution 
was not approved by the mayor, the resolution is invalid. 
Under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may be 
entered when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Based on the undisputed facts and the legal 
principles set forth above, the Preservation League requests that summary judgment be 
entered against Petitioner on the grounds that the resolution has not been approved by the 
mayor. 
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CONCLUSION 
The haste and recklessness with which the special election was scheduled, which 
has led in turn to the harried pace and course of this litigation, exposes this effort for what 
it really is: an illegitimate power grab by an unrepresentative portion of government 
officials in the City of Holladay. Three council members, representing only narrowly-
confined geographical districts, and aligned with the interests of local developers, have 
attempted a palace coup to throw out the mayor of Holladay in the middle of the four-
year term to which he was elected in a city-wide race by a majority of all voters. 
Whether one likes the current mayor or not, nothing can justify discarding the current 
constitutional structure of Holladay City to serve illegitimate purposes by unauthorized 
means. The Petition should be dismissed, or in the alternative, summary judgment should 
be entered against Petitioner. The Preservation League also requests that it be awarded 
its costs and attorney fees in this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / day of July, 2003. 
TESCH GRAHAM P.C. 
Joseph E. Tescr 
Kraig J. Powell 
Attorneys for Holladay Preservation League 
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